Indonesia and Israel became modern nations at approximately the same time. Indonesia declared independence on 17 August 1945 in the wake of the Japanese surrender, though it then had to battle the returning Dutch forces for a further four years. Over half a century later, however, Indonesia and Israel are yet to establish diplomatic relations. It might be thought that Indonesia's initial rejection of overtures from Israel had to do primarily with pan-Islamic sentiment. After all, the most vocal source of anti-Israeli sentiment in Indonesia in recent years has been radical Islamist groups for which virulent anti-Semitism has become virtually an article of faith.1 In fact, antipathy, or at least ambivalence, toward Israel in the Republic of Indonesia during its first two decades had much more to do with the desire of its first president, Sukarno, to build relations with other former European colonies, including Arab nations, in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).2 When Suharto seized power from Sukarno in the mid-1960s and established a military-backed authoritarian regime, much of the mental baggage of the Sukarno era was jettisoned. Israel's remarkable resili­ence in the 1967 Six-Day War elicited admiration rather than antagon­ism from Jakarta. Few Indonesians strongly identified with Israel's enemies and even if they did not know much about Israel, many admired its feisty self-defense in the face of Arab aggression. Covert relations between Israel and Indonesia continued to develop over the next quarter of a century. But the Suharto regime was nothing if not pragmatic and was increasingly mindful of the potential for radical Islamist groups to make trouble. Moreover, in the decades that fol­lowed, the continued Israeli presence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip provided the Islamists with a means of eliciting broader sympathy for their anti-Israeli stance. The signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles in September 1993 opened the way for Israel and Indonesia to move overtly toward normalizing relations. With the Israel-PLO agreement in place, first Arafat and then Rabin visited Jakarta and talked with Suharto. One year later Abdurrahman Wahid, the moderate leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the thirty-million-strong, traditionalist Islamic organiza­tion, and Djohan Effendi, a leading Islamic intellectual in interfaith dialogue and private speech writer for Suharto, visited Jerusalem at the invitation of Prime Minister Rabin to witness the signing of the peace accord with Jordan. When Abdurrahman Wahid became president himself in 1999, he made normalizing Indonesian-Israeli relations a personal goal. His failure to win control of parliament, however, saw his term in office truncated and his ambitiously reformist presidency replaced by the "do-nothing" presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri. Her replacement, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was directly elected president in September 2004 after winning a massive 21 percent more votes than the lackluster incumbent. But despite his clear popular mandate, Yud­hoyono faces the same problem as Wahid in securing the support of the parliament. His cautious nature and his reliance on two small radical Islamist parties means that any breakthrough in Indonesian-Israeli relations will likely have to be preceded by success in peace-building initiatives between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

The Sukarno Period (1945-1965)

To properly understand the issues besetting Indonesian-Israeli rela­tions it is necessary to consider historical developments decades before either state came into being. As early as the 1920s, discussions on the question of Palestine in Indonesian Muslim social movements were marked by feelings of affinity for Arabs and of Islamic solidarity. The future of Palestine was a regular topic of discussion at the annual meetings of the Islamic organization Muhammadiyah that was formed in 1912 to propagate the modernist ideas of Muhammad Abduh, which today, together with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), is one of the two large mass-based organizations that dominate Islamic affairs in Indonesia. During World War II, there was criticism in the Indonesian Muslim community of the negative attitude that the British exhibited toward the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini. Given the many thousands of Indonesian scholars who studied in Egypt, Mecca, Medina, and other centers of learning in the Arab world, and the tens of thousands of ordinary Indonesians who made haj and umroh pilgrimages to the Saudi peninsula, it is not surprising that the future of Palestine has long been a concern of pious Indonesian Muslims.

During Indonesia's four-year armed struggle with its former Dutch colonial rulers, President Sukarno and the rest of the Indonesian leadership worked to develop relations with Arab countries even as these countries were engaged in their own struggle for independence. One of the first diplomatic missions dispatched by the Indonesian government was to the Middle East, and was headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Haji Agus Salim. The mission was a response to a resolution of the Arab League Foreign Ministers Council on 18 Nov­ember 1946 recognizing Indonesia's independence. Agus Salim, who was proficient in Arabic, established diplomatic and consular relations with Egypt, and soon visited Syria and Saudi Arabia as well to sign similar agreements. Such ties bore fruit in international forums; when Indonesia's independence struggle with the Netherlands was discussed at the United Nations, the Arab delegations supported Indonesia.

Sukarno's concept of the Indonesian nation found formal expres­sion in the official state ideology of Pancasila (or "Five Precepts"), which stressed national unity and a theistic but nonsectarian secular­ism instead of an Islamist conception of an Islamic state. Sukarno, with the backing of some prominent Islamic leaders including Wahid Hasyim, father of Abdurrahman Wahid, resisted Islamist pressure to formulate the Indonesian constitution along explicitly Islamic lines. Today the adoption of Pancasila is widely seen as one of Sukarno's greatest achievements. Although Sukarno's championing of Pancasila reflected his revolutionary spirit at its most moderate and sensible, there was much else about his leadership that was far less unambigu­ously positive, and the left-right polarization of Indonesian society that raced out of control in the last five years of his presidency was to have tragic consequences. At the heart of this was the fact that Sukarno's brand of nationalism was among the more strident in the postcolonial transition period after World War II. Rejecting the notion of dominance by the Cold War rivals, Sukarno moved Indonesia toward a stance of nonalignment. Thus it was far more for reasons of postcolonial-rather than pan-Islamic-solidarity that Indonesia energetically supported the Arabs in their conflict with the new state of Israel, which Sukarno came to regard as a bridgehead of Western imperialism in the emerging Afro-Asian world.

Indonesia's early disposition toward the Jewish state was clearly not the result of any intentional or accidental diplomatic slight by Israel. In fact, Israeli state records indicate that the emergence of the largest Muslim country in the world was noted with interest in Jerusalem. In December 1949, President Chaim Weizmann and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion sent telegrams to President Sukarno and Foreign Minister-later deputy premier-Muhammad Hatta con­gratulating them on the Treaty of Independence with the Netherlands. In January 1950, Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett sent a telegram to his counterpart, Muhammad Hatta, informing him that Israel had decided to grant Indonesia full recognition. Hatta responded to both Sharett and Ben-Gurion with thanks, but did not offer reciprocal sentiments in regard to diplomatic recognition. Sensing Indonesia's evasiveness, Sharett wrote to Hatta suggesting that a goodwill mission be sent to Indonesia, to which Foreign Minister Hatta responded courteously in May 1950, but suggested that such a mission be post­poned to a later time.³

Indonesian reluctance toward dealing with Israel grew more pro­nounced as Sukarno's government became more authoritarian and left-leaning in character. An early indication of Indonesia's pro-Arab, anti-Israeli policy surfaced in June 1952 when items in the Arab and Pakistani press quoting the Indonesian news agency, Antara, reported that the Indonesian government had no intention of recognizing Israel because the majority in Indonesia was Muslim and because of the support that Arab states had given Indonesia during its fight for independence.⁴

The situation deteriorated further. In February 1953, Reuven Barkat, head of the Political Department of the Histadrut-the peak body of Israeli labor unions-could still visit Indonesia and meet with a number of public figures. About the same time, the Indonesian ambassador-later foreign minister-to London, Suban­drio, approached his Israeli counterpart, Eliahu Elath, telling him that his government had instructed him to take a private, unofficial visit to Israel to learn what Israel could contribute to the develop­ment of Asian countries generally, and Indonesia in particular, and to examine the background of the Arab-Israeli tensions. The visit was set for March 1953, but it never took place. The secretary-general of the Indonesian Socialist Party visited Israel in July 1953 as the guest of Barkat, but it proved to be the last of such contacts. In November 1953, Indonesia ceased granting entrance visas to Isra­eli citizens, initially to those with diplomatic passports and sub­sequently to all Israelis.⁵

 In 1953, Sukarno began organizing a conference of Asian and African countries, which was eventually held in Bandung, West Java, in April 1955 without Israel's participation.⁶ Indonesia and Pakistan resolutely opposed Israel's participation and were able to convince the governments of Burma, India, and Ceylon, which had initially supported Israel's taking part, to change their positions. A second meeting of Colombo Plan states⁷ was held in New Delhi on 12-14 November 1956, at Indonesia's instigation, in response to the Suez Crisis. In Indonesia, the British-French attack prompted considerable anger toward Britain, France, and Israel and sympathy for Egypt, whose nationalization of the Suez Canal was supported by Indonesia. On 2 November, the Indonesian parliament unanimously condemned the attacks on Egypt and recommended breaking diplomatic ties with Britain and France. There was a flurry of anti-Israeli declarations by many Indonesian leaders during the Sukarno years, a practice that cut across party lines. The exception was the Socialist Party, which, while wanting to maintain contacts with Israel, carried little weight. Indonesia fully engaged in the clamor for anti-Israeli declarations in the United Nations and other international forums. Muslim solidarity was far from the only reason for Indonesian hostility; in fact, it appears to have resulted primarily from Indonesia's need to maintain Arab support on the issue of Western Guinea (Western Irian), an area Indonesia wanted to annex but that was still under Dutch rule. The Indonesian diplomatic whom Israelis encountered admitted candidly that the number of Arab votes in the United Nations-ten at the time-far outnumbered Israel's one vote.⁸

 

After Sukarno's effective removal from power in October 1965, Gen­eral Suharto moved to put Indonesia's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict on a more moderate course. By this time, however, support for the Arab cause and a disinclination to pursue formal relations with Israel had been broadly institutionalized in Indonesian foreign policy. The Indonesian government continued to express sympathy for the Arab position and make the now standard criticisms of Israel in diplomatic forums. Indonesia, however, called for a more pragmatic and moderate approach by the Arabs, a stance that clearly contrasted with the majority of Arab nations at the time.

This tendency first appeared in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War. The Israel Defense Forces' defeat of adversaries on all fronts is said to have impressed the higher echelons of the Indonesian army. Indonesia called for direct talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors to resolve the outstanding issues and suggested that the United Nations establish international supervision of Jerusalem to ensure freedom for all religions. Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, both in public statements and informal contacts with Israeli representatives, said the Arabs should respect Israel's aspiration for territorial and national recognition. In private channels, he advised Israel to simply accept Indonesia's official pro-Arab statements as designed primarily for in­ternal consumption, and explained that Arab propaganda about Israel had a pervasive effect on Indonesian public opinion. The subtle change in Indonesia's approach after Suharto came to power did not go unnoticed. In order to ease the concern of Arab countries and of radical Muslim circles in Indonesia itself, during Saudi King Faisal's visit to Indonesia in June 1970, President Suharto restated his unequivocal support for the lawful Arab "struggle" against "Israeli aggression." In 1972, Foreign Minister Malik toured a number of Arab countries and announced that Indonesia would not object to the PLO opening an office in Jakarta. In fact, such an office did not open until 1990; senior army officers were concerned that a PLO office would attract agitators and extreme Muslim groups, and the government may also have thought it would make it harder to conduct unofficial dealings with Israel, particularly in military matters. In con­trast, neighboring Malaysia moved quickly to grant the PLO full diplomatic status. Yasser Arafat's first visit to Jakarta occurred only in July 1984. He was received warmly enough, although by this time Suharto had already visited Iran and various Arab states twice and significantly increased the number of Indonesian diplomatic offices in Arab countries.

Indonesia took a somewhat neutral stand on the 1978 Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. At a meeting of the Organi­zation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Fez in May 1979, Indonesia abstained-along with Malaysia and Bangladesh-on the vote to sus­pend Egypt's membership in the organization. In a pragmatic sense it seemed that, albeit passively, Indonesia supported the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord.⁹

Suharto kept a tight lid on Islamic political activity during most of his years in power. The main safety valve for Islamic political expression was one of two officially sanctioned opposition parties, the Islamic-oriented United Development Party (PPP). Neither opposi­tion party was allowed sufficient autonomy to seriously challenge the stranglehold of Suharto's party apparatus, Golkar. The other safety valve was to adhere, at least officially, to a foreign policy with pan-Islamic and pro-Arab underpinnings and so to deprive Islamist radicals of a valuable line of criticism that might have enabled them to mobilize broad social support.

Suharto and his senior leadership were pragmatic about main­taining their firm grip on power, which was at all times based on ensuring the preeminence of the Indonesian armed forces. This imper­ative led to a series of back-channel transactions between the Indone­sian army and Israel. Indeed, press reports surfaced that in September 1979 Indonesia signed an agreement to buy twenty-eight Skyhawk aircraft and eleven helicopters from the Israeli air force surplus. By 1982, Indonesia had admitted publicly that it had had dealings with Israel via a third party-the United States was not named but was clearly implied-while at the same time Indonesian diplomats con­tinued to publicly denounce Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights and military foray into Lebanon. Yet the door opened still wider when, in late 1983, restrictions on Indonesian passports for visits to Israel were scrapped.

In the late 1980s, Suharto decided strategically to show a greater appreciation of Islamic matters and essentially co-opt Muslim groups into a more cooperative relationship. He officially recognized the "state of Palestine," and the above-mentioned PLO office finally opened in Jakarta in 1990. The Suharto family began living a more Islamic lifestyle, including a Haj pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991 that was accom­panied by extensive media coverage.¹⁰ By 1992, Indonesia was acting as chair of the NAM and the possibility of negative reaction from Arab states ruled out Jakarta normalizing relations with Israel. Nevertheless, some small but notable developments occurred: the granting of entry visas to Israelis was further relaxed, Indonesian journalists were per­mitted to visit Israel, postal and direct telephone connections were established, and there was a general softening in Indonesian statements at international forums.

In June 1993, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his In­donesian counterpart Ali Alatas met informally at the UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. During their brief conversation, Peres said Israel was interested in establishing open diplomatic relations with Indonesia. The Indonesian foreign minister reportedly responded that normalizing relations would become possible if there was progress in peace talks and the Arab-Israeli conflict was more or less resolved. Israel's ambassador to Singapore, Daniel Megido, followed up on the Peres-Alatas encounter with informal meetings of his own with colleagues in Jakarta from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Under questioning by the Indonesian press, Alatas was forced to deny any knowledge of such meetings and downplay the importance of his own chance encounter with Peres. Significantly, however, Indonesia's defense minister, Edi Sudrajat, said Indonesia would consider normal­izing relations with Israel provided, of course, that the peace process went well and that Palestinian interests were not compromised. He added that if all the Arab states were to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, Indonesia would certainly do likewise.¹¹

The signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) between Israel and the PLO several months later in September 1993 appeared to open a new door in relations between Israel and Muslim Asia. After all, not only had China established full diplomatic relations with Israel eighteen months earlier, so too had India, home to one of the world's largest Muslim populations. Moreover, if there had earlier been signs that Suharto was at pains not to upset Arab nations during Indonesia's bid for the chairmanship of the NAM, having secured the chair he was clearly much more relaxed. Consequently, while Rabin's historic but low-key visit to Jakarta three weeks after a visit by Arafat was surprising, it was not wholly unexpected. Both leaders called on Suharto in his capacity as NAM chairman and both did so on their way back to the Middle East from a visit to Beijing. Suharto kept news of Rabin's visit secret until his plane was safely parked on the tarmac in Singapore four hours later, and Rabin's motorcade from the Halim military airport to Suharto's residence was a quiet affair without flashing lights and sirens, though the visit was later reported in the press.

It appeared as if privately Suharto was exploring the possibility of strengthening relations with Israel. As was typical of Suharto, however, the signals were ambiguous and contradictory. In the same month as Rabin's visit, Indonesian military commander General Faisal Tanjung was forced to deny claims that the Indonesian military had acquired Israeli hardware. In the following months, pressure from hardline Islamist groups led to protests against the visit of four senior journalists to Israel and the banning of the film Schindler's List. Then toward the end of 1994, the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs announced that Indonesia had begun to allow Israeli tourists to visit, only for the Indonesian director-general of tourism to deny such a policy shift several days later. But 1994 also saw the visit of a large delegation from the Israeli Chamber of Commerce and, separately, an official visit from the director of the Israel Customs Service to discuss trade arrangements. The Indonesian press had earlier reported that the value of Indonesian exports had grown from a negligible amount in 1991 to more than $1.7 million in 1992.¹² Israeli trade delegations continued to visit Indonesia in 1995 and 1996, apparently with the blessings of the Suharto government. By this stage, several thousand Indonesians were traveling to Israel each year to visit Islamic and Christian holy sites with the full backing of the Indonesian govern­ment. At the United Nations 50th anniversary celebration in New York in October 1995, Prime Minister Rabin and President Suharto met for a second time and agreed on the need to move toward normaliz­ing their countries' relations, beginning with improved trade ties.

 

Arguably the most significant development after Rabin's visit to Jakarta in October 1993 was the visit of Indonesia's most influential Islamic leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, to Jerusalem one year later. As leader of NU, Indonesia's-and the world's-largest Islamic mass organization, Abdurrahman's acceptance of an invitation from Shimon Peres to witness the peace-accord ceremony between Israel and Jordan on 25 October 1994 was highly significant. Of course, the visit looks even more significant in light of Abdurrahman becoming Indonesia's first democratically elected president five years later. But even apart from Abdurrahman's public prominence, his relationship with Israel and with Judaism warrants attention for what it tells us about the development of Islamic thought in Indonesia and about the potential of Islam generally to contribute to building understanding and consol­idating respect and tolerance between peoples.¹³

 As we have seen, one of the key factors militating against devel­oping relations between Israel and Muslim-majority nations in Asia, home to most of the world's Muslims, is the fear of agitation by conservative and reactionary Islamist groups protesting closer ties with a nation long demonized in their internal discourses. Con­sequently, the impression is given that Islam is a source of problems and that Muslim leaders will invariably play a spoiling role. The example of Abdurrahman Wahid is a valuable reminder that this need not be so.

Born in 1940, Abdurrahman Wahid is the eldest son of the much-admired nationalist leader Wahid Hasyim, an official national hero, leading light in NU, minister of religious affairs, and friend of Sukarno. Both of Wahid's grandfathers, Hasyim Asy'ari on his father's side and Bisri Syansuri on his mother's, were founders of NU and respected leaders of the nationalist movement. Although not quite as progressive as the remarkable Wahid Hasyim, both of the older men were regarded as innovative and enlightened ulama, or religious scholars, who pion­eered new approaches to teaching in their East Java pesantren (residen­tial madrasah, or traditional religious schools). After Abdurrahman Wahid graduated from his pesantren educa­tion in Central and East Java, he was sent to study at the venerable Al Azhar Islamic University in Cairo. Quickly tiring of the rote-learning approach he encountered at Al Azhar, Abdurrahman spent most of his time in Cairo reading Western literature in the American University library, watching French cinema, and engaging in long discussions in the city's coffee shops. It made for a great informal education but did nothing for his studies at Al Azhar. In 1966 he transferred to the University of Baghdad, then regarded as the best modern university in the Arab world, where he completed a four-year degree in Arabic literature and Islamic history.

While studying in Baghdad, Abdurrahman worked part-time as a translator cum letter-writer at a textile export company, side by side with an Iraqi Jew named Ramin. Abdurrahman knew very little about Judaism and Jewish history when he arrived in Baghdad, but after four years of daily conversations with Ramin he had developed a deep respect for Jewish religious thought and culture. Upon returning to Indonesia, Abdurrahman fell in love with the novels of the American Jewish writer Chaim Potok, seeing parallels with his own community in the conservative religious community described in works such as My Name Is Asher Lev.

Always an idiosyncratic and original thinker, Abdurrahman's per­sonal engagement with Jewish thought caused him to react critically to the simplistic and prejudicial notions about Israel and the Jews that he encountered in Muslim society. Consequently, for the past thirty years he has made a point of speaking out against anti-Semitic thinking and ignorance about Israel and Judaism. And he has made numerous visits to Israel, the earliest taking place in 1980. It is not surprising, then, that he was quick to accept Peres's invitation to visit Israel in October 1994 and then in March 1997 to join the Board of Governors of the Shimon Peres Peace Center. Nor is it remarkable that criticism about being pro-Zionist by Amien Rais, his longtime nemesis and leader of Muhammadiyah, or negative comments by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, did not stop Abdurrahman from traveling to Israel in October 1997 to speak at the Peres Peace Center.

What is remarkable is that despite the controversy that erupted after his October 1994 visit, Abdurrahman was elected to a third five-year term as executive chairman of NU just weeks after returning from Israel. Although in the 1980s Abdurrahman had enjoyed a reasonable working relationship with Suharto, since 1990 the relationship had turned increasingly antagonistic. Abdurrahman was particularly crit­ical of Suharto's new ploy of co-opting and appeasing both social-conservative and radical Islamists and warned of the dangers of grow­ing sectarian sentiment. But he was also generally critical of the Suharto regime's record of human rights abuses and rampant corrup­tion. He made full use of the measure of protection conferred by his status as NU leader to boldly confront Suharto in a manner that few others dared attempt. So when Abdurrahman announced after returning from Israel that he had decided to reverse his previous decision to retire from leadership after a decade at the helm of NU, and that he was running for a third five-year term at the November five-yearly congress of NU, Suharto was infuriated. Abdurrahman justified his change of heart by explaining that he expected the next five years would see the end of the Suharto regime and that NU would be called upon to play a critical role in the difficult transition that followed. Suharto threw everything he could against Abdurrahman's bid for reelection; aside from attempting to buy votes for his chosen candidate and using the military to intimidate Abdurrahman's sup­porters, Suharto sponsored a virulent campaign against him in the press. But despite heated invective against him that played heavily on his "Zionist sympathies," the over three hundred branch delegates voted decisively to reelect Abdurrahman. It appeared that socially conservative though it was, anti-Zionist arguments and naked anti-Semitism held little sway over the NU community.

It would be beyond this article's scope to detail the remarkable circumstances that saw Abdurrahman elected president by the parliamentary electoral college in October 1999, or to describe how his exaggerated reformist ambitions-reining in the military and tackling a corrupt business elite, maverick leadership style, and inability to convert moral capital into political capital-his party, PKB, held but 10 percent of the seats in parliament-saw his presidency end less than two years later. Suffice it to say that when he suddenly found himself president, Abdurrahman launched a bold program of translating his long-held reformist aspirations into reality, including working to pro­mote relations with Israel.

Three days after becoming president, Abdurrahman traveled to Bali to fulfill a longstanding commitment to address an international business conference. There he took the opportunity to say that Indone­sia should follow the lead of some Arab nations and establish commer­cial legations in Israel. Several weeks later he attended the convocation of the World Conference on Religion and Peace in Amman, Jordan, stopping by in the Persian Gulf to quietly explain his policy of engaging with Israel. While in Amman he spoke privately of his hope of flying to Jerusalem that week.¹⁴ He was talked out of visiting Israel only at the last moment, and did not get another opportunity to visit during his presidency. He did, however, receive various delegations from Israeli government agencies, including visits by the directors-general of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Foreign Ministry, and from pro-Israeli groups such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC).

After being forced out of office Abdurrahman made some further visits to Israel, including one in June 2003 in which he joined Mikhail Gorbachev and F.W. de Klerk at a major international conference in Netanya and addressed an interfaith gathering in Jerusalem alongside Israel's Sephardic Chief Rabbi Bakshi-Doron. His links have always been strongest with Shimon Peres and his Labor Party, but he also has friends in other parties, such as Likud's Dan Meridor. In his June 2003 visit he was glad to meet Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom and, together with Gorbachev and de Klerk, enjoyed a frank and protracted late-night discussion with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in which they lobbied Sharon to engage Arafat in the peace process despite the acknowledged difficulties that entailed.¹⁵ The previous year he ad­dressed the annual convention of the AJC in Washington and spoke to AIJAC groups in Melbourne and Sydney. In December 2003, Ab­durrahman returned to Israel to participate in a symposium on the Middle East Peace initiative.

 

 As has already been noted, like other Muslim-majority nations in Asia, Indonesia's initial reluctance about diplomatic relations with Israel arose out of solidarity with other former European colonies in the Arab world and a more pragmatic concern about the power of the Arab vote in the NAM. More recently it is fear of harsh responses from domestic Islamist groups that has restrained Indonesia from normalizing relations with Israel. Change in this area clearly depends on a successful conclusion to the peace process, since Muslim Asia is certain to follow the lead of the Arab countries when it comes to relations with Israel. Nevertheless, trade flows and people-to-people ties between Israel and Indonesia have steadily improved since the Oslo DoP was signed in 1993. The lesson to be drawn from the experience of Abdurrahman Wahid is that people-to-people links and in particular academic ex­changes are much more important than is commonly realized. Liberal Islamic intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Djohan Effendi might not be typical of mainstream Muslim society in Indonesia, but they do have broad influence and have helped develop hundreds of link-minded younger intellectuals and dozens of progressive Islamic NGOs. Building ties with such thinkers and civil society groups in Indonesia will not eliminate the influence of radical minorities or stop the circulation of anti-Semitic propaganda, but it will help coun­ter those negative influences and foster genuine understanding and friendship. 

http://www.jcpa.org/jcpa/templates/showpage.asp?dbid=1&lngid=1&tmid=111&fid=253&pid=0&iid=1802

 

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RI minister under fire for Israel comment RI menteri di bawah api untuk komentar Israel

A comment by Justice and Human Rights minister Patrialis Akbar saying that terrorists should bomb Israel for the country's cruel treatment of Palestinians has prompted criticism from Israel. Sebuah komentar oleh Menteri Kehakiman dan Hak Asasi Manusia Patrialis Akbar mengatakan bahwa teroris harus bom Israel untuk perlakuan kejam negara Palestina telah mendorong kecaman dari Israel.

In an interview with Al Jazeera TV a week ago, Patrialis said that terrorists should not make Indonesia their target because the source of their conflict was Israel. Dalam wawancara dengan Al Jazeera TV seminggu yang lalu, Patrialis mengatakan bahwa teroris tidak harus membuat Indonesia target mereka karena sumber konflik mereka adalah Israel.

“If Indonesians are angry with Israel, they should not have carried out bomb attacks here, but rather in Israel instead. "Jika Indonesia marah dengan Israel, mereka seharusnya tidak melakukan serangan bom di sini, melainkan di Israel sebagai gantinya. They could make themselves heroes and sow seeds of praises that way,” he said. Mereka bisa membuat diri mereka pahlawan dan menabur benih memuji seperti itu, "katanya.

Indonesian officials previously said that Israel's occupation of Palestine had triggered terrorist attacks elsewhere, with Indonesia becoming one of the main targets, although Jakarta has never supported Israel's policy toward Palestine. pejabat Indonesia sebelumnya mengatakan bahwa pendudukan Israel di Palestina telah memicu serangan teroris di tempat lain, dengan Indonesia menjadi salah satu target utama, meskipun Jakarta telah pernah mendukung kebijakan Israel terhadap Palestina.

Indonesia has been rocked by several major bomb attacks, the latest a double bombing of two luxurious hotels in Jakarta last July. Indonesia telah diguncang oleh beberapa serangan bom besar, pemboman yang terbaru ganda dua hotel mewah di Jakarta Juli lalu. Other major attacks killed hundreds in Bali in 2002 and 2005. serangan besar lainnya menewaskan ratusan di Bali pada tahun 2002 dan 2005.

The interview with Patrialis had been intended to discuss his ministry's role in deradicalizing members of Jamaah Islamiyah, a group that was allegedly behind terror acts in Indonesia. Wawancara dengan Patrialis telah dimaksudkan untuk membahas peran pelayanannya dalam deradicalizing anggota Jamaah Islamiyah, sebuah kelompok yang diduga di balik aksi teror di Indonesia.

“We can fund them and protect their families here ... "Kita bisa dana mereka dan melindungi keluarga mereka di sini ... If they go to Israel — I will totally support that,” Patrialis said. Jika mereka pergi ke Israel - aku benar-benar akan mendukung itu, "kata Patrialis. However, Patrialis later toned down his words, saying he did not encourage violence. Namun, Patrialis kemudian melunakkan kata-katanya, mengatakan ia tidak mendorong kekerasan.

“We are looking for options to help Palestinians... "Kami mencari opsi untuk membantu Palestina ... we want to help Palestinians and we think those terrorist have wrongly turned against us,” he said. kami ingin membantu Palestina dan kami pikir mereka teroris telah salah berbalik melawan kita, "katanya.

Indonesia has been a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause, while Jakarta has no diplomatic ties with Israel. Indonesia telah menjadi pendukung setia Palestina, sementara Jakarta tidak memiliki hubungan diplomatik dengan Israel. Jakarta strongly condemned Israeli attacks against an international aid flotilla bound for Gaza last month. Jakarta sangat mengutuk serangan Israel terhadap sebuah armada bantuan internasional menuju Gaza bulan lalu.

Indonesia also strongly denounced Israeli for its major offensive targeting Hezbollah in Gaza in December 2008. Indonesia juga sangat mengutuk serangan besar Israel untuk target yang diinginkan Hizbullah di Gaza pada bulan Desember 2008.

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor said that it was “immoral and illegal to encourage terrorist actions in one country or anywhere.” “Experience has shown that this will only backfire... Juru bicara Departemen Luar Negeri Israel Yigal Palmor mengatakan bahwa itu "" tidak bermoral dan ilegal untuk mendorong aksi teroris di satu negara atau di mana saja. "Pengalaman telah menunjukkan bahwa hal ini hanya akan menjadi bumerang ... He should be very careful with what he says,” Palmor told Al Jazeera TV. Ia harus sangat berhati-hati dengan apa yang dia katakan, "Palmor mengatakan kepada Al Jazeera TV.

Dino Patti Djalal, a spokesman for the Indonesian President, said that Patrialis had only been expressing his frustration and that his words did not represent Jakarta's position. Dino Patti Djalal, juru bicara Presiden Indonesia, mengatakan bahwa Patrialis hanya telah mengungkapkan frustrasi dan bahwa kata-katanya tidak mewakili posisi Jakarta.

“There was a lot of anger in the Indonesian community because some Indonesians were on that boat [aid flotilla] and were hurt,” Dino told Al Jazeera TV. "Ada banyak kemarahan di masyarakat Indonesia karena beberapa orang Indonesia di bahwa perahu [bantuan armada] dan terluka," kata Dino Al Jazeera TV. “He was only expressing his frustration with the situation.” "Dia hanya mengekspresikan frustrasi dengan situasi."


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RI disappointed by Israeli settlement extension RI kecewa dengan perluasan permukiman Israel

Indonesia has expressed its disappointment at Israel's decision to end its freeze of settlement construction in Gaza, calling it “irresponsible”, while efforts to salvage the Middle East peace negotiations continued. Indonesia telah menyatakan kekecewaannya tersebut pada keputusan Israel untuk membekukan akhir atas pembangunan permukiman di Gaza, menyebutnya "bertanggung jawab", sedangkan upaya untuk menyelamatkan perundingan perdamaian Timur Tengah terus berlanjut.

“[Israel's] decision is really disappointing and really unacceptable,” Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said Sunday as quoted by Antara after signing the UN Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances at the UN headquarters in New York. "Keputusan [Israel] adalah benar mengecewakan dan benar-benar tidak dapat diterima," kata Menteri Luar Negeri Indonesia Marty Natalegawa Minggu seperti dikutip Antara setelah menandatangani Konvensi PBB untuk Perlindungan Semua Orang dari Penghilangan Paksa di kantor pusat PBB di New York.

“Now we, along with Palestine and other countries, are drawing up our next steps.” "Sekarang kita, bersama dengan Palestina dan negara-negara lain, adalah menyusun langkah berikutnya."

Marty said that by letting its moratorium on settlement building on the West Bank expire, Israel would be held responsible if direct peace talks between the long-standing foes failed. Marty mengatakan bahwa dengan membiarkan moratorium pada pembangunan pemukiman di Tepi Barat berakhir, Israel akan bertanggung jawab jika pembicaraan damai langsung antara musuh lama gagal.

The talks only resumed in September this year after being halted since late 2008. Pembicaraan hanya dilanjutkan pada bulan September tahun ini setelah terhenti sejak akhir 2008.

Marty said Indonesia, Brazil, India and South Africa were making up efforts in favor of Palestine, to salvage the peace process that has been thrown into doubt “because of the notoriously irresponsible behavior of the Israeli government”. Marty mengatakan, Indonesia, Brasil, India dan Afrika Selatan sedang membuat upaya mendukung Palestina, untuk menyelamatkan proses perdamaian yang telah dilemparkan ke dalam keraguan "karena perilaku terkenal tidak bertanggung jawab dari pemerintah Israel".

The four countries are grouped in a forum set up just last week to support Palestine. Empat negara dikelompokkan dalam sebuah forum dibentuk minggu lalu untuk mendukung Palestina.

“Now we are seeking input from the Palestinian side, for example, what they need from us. "Sekarang kita sedang mencari masukan dari pihak Palestina, misalnya, apa yang mereka butuhkan dari kita. There are options for us to take, whether [to provide support] through the [UN] Security Council or the Non-Aligned Movement General Assembly,” Marty said. Ada pilihan bagi kita untuk mengambil, apakah [untuk memberikan dukungan] melalui [PBB] Dewan Keamanan atau Gerakan Non-Blok Majelis Umum, "kata Marty.

On Monday night, Washington dispatched special envoy George Mitchell to the region to try to bridge gaps that Palestinian, Israeli and US officials failed to close in a frenetic round of meetings in the US last week, The Associated Press reported. Pada Senin malam, Washington mengirim utusan khusus George Mitchell ke wilayah tersebut untuk mencoba menjembatani kesenjangan yang Palestina, Israel dan pejabat AS gagal untuk menutup di putaran ingar-bingar pertemuan di AS minggu lalu, The Associated Press melaporkan.

The US, which brokered the peace talks, appears to have at least one week to work on its diplomatic efforts to avert what would be a major embarrassment for US President Barack Obama, with Palestinians holding back from carrying out a threat to walk away from the table. AS, yang ditengahi pembicaraan perdamaian, tampaknya memiliki setidaknya satu minggu untuk bekerja pada upaya-upaya diplomatik untuk mencegah apa yang akan membuat malu besar bagi Presiden AS Barack Obama, dengan Palestina menahan dari melakukan ancaman untuk berjalan kaki dari tabel.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas gave US mediation more time to work when he announced Monday he wouldn't decide whether to abandon the talks before consulting senior Arab officials in Cairo next week, AP reported. Presiden Palestina Mahmoud Abbas memberikan US mediasi lebih banyak waktu untuk bekerja ketika ia mengumumkan Senin ia tidak akan memutuskan apakah akan meninggalkan pembicaraan sebelum konsultasi pejabat senior Arab di Kairo minggu depan, AP melaporkan.

An Arab League official has told AP that Arab foreign ministers were expected to endorse whatever position Abbas took. Seorang pejabat Liga Arab telah mengatakan kepada AP bahwa menteri luar negeri Arab tersebut diharapkan akan mendukung apapun Abbas mengambil posisi.

A senior Palestinian official said as quoted by AP that the Palestine Liberation Organization's 18-member decision-making body would meet Wednesday or Thursday to formulate a position before Abbas meets with Arab League envoys. Seorang pejabat senior Palestina mengatakan seperti dikutip oleh AP bahwa 18-anggota tubuh Organisasi Pembebasan Palestina pengambilan keputusan akan bertemu hari Rabu atau Kamis untuk merumuskan posisi sebelum Abbas bertemu dengan utusan Liga Arab.

He spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal Palestinian deliberations. Dia berbicara dengan syarat anonim untuk membahas musyawarah internal Palestina.

US State Department spokesman PJ Crowley praised Abbas for not immediately walking out of the talks and chided Israel for resisting international pressure to halt new construction in the West Bank — territory the Palestinians claim as part of their future state. Juru bicara Departemen Luar Negeri AS PJ Crowley memuji Abbas karena tidak segera berjalan keluar dari pembicaraan dan mencaci Israel untuk menentang tekanan internasional untuk menghentikan konstruksi baru di Tepi Barat - wilayah Palestina klaim sebagai bagian dari negara masa depan mereka.

“We are disappointed but we remain focused on our long-term objective and will be talking to the parties about the implications of the Israeli decision,” Crowley said. "Kami kecewa tapi kami tetap fokus pada tujuan jangka panjang kami dan akan berbicara dengan para pihak tentang implikasi dari keputusan Israel," kata Crowley.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and senior European officials have also criticized Israel's decision. Sekretaris Jenderal PBB Ban Ki-moon dan para pejabat senior Eropa juga mengecam keputusan Israel.

In Paris on Tuesday, Abbas urged Israel to halt new West Bank settlement construction as long as the Mideast talks continued, saying he feared the two sides might miss a “historic opportunity” if Israel refuses to renew the newly expired freeze. Di Paris pada hari Selasa, Abbas mendesak Israel untuk menghentikan pembangunan pemukiman baru Barat Bank selama perundingan Timur Tengah melanjutkan, mengatakan ia takut kedua belah pihak mungkin akan kehilangan satu "kesempatan bersejarah" jika Israel menolak untuk memperbaharui membeku yang baru berakhir.


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RI will not forge ties with Israel, Taiwan: Marty RI tidak akan menjalin hubungan dengan Israel, Taiwan: Marty

Indonesia forging new diplomatic relations with 21 countries - but not Israel and Taiwan, says the nation's top diplomat. Indonesia menempa hubungan diplomatik baru dengan 21 negara - tetapi tidak Israel dan Taiwan, kata diplomat tinggi bangsa.

"We will not open diplomatic relations with Israel until they comply with all available United Nations resolutions," Foreign Affairs Minister Marty Natalegawa said. "Kami tidak akan membuka hubungan diplomatik dengan Israel sampai mereka mematuhi semua resolusi yang tersedia Bangsa-Bangsa," kata Menteri Luar Negeri Marty Natalegawa.

Indonesia continued to support Palestinian independence "side by side" with Israel, he said. Indonesia terus mendukung kemerdekaan "berdampingan" Palestina dengan Israel, katanya.

Marty said Indonesia would not open relations with Taiwan due to the “One China” policy it previously agreed to with Beijing. Marty mengatakan Indonesia tidak akan membuka hubungan dengan Taiwan karena kebijakan "Satu Cina" itu sebelumnya setuju untuk dengan Beijing. (gzl) (Gzl)




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Indonesia-Israel relations Hubungan Indonesia-Israel

Map indicating location of Indonesia and Israel Peta yang menunjukkan lokasi Indonesia dan Israel
Indonesia Indonesia	Israel Israel

Indonesia–Israel relations refers to the historical and current bilateral relationship between Israel and Indonesia . Hubungan Indonesia-Israel mengacu pada saat ini dan sejarah hubungan bilateral antara Israel dan Indonesia . The two countries maintain no formal diplomatic ties. ^{[ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ]} Kedua negara tidak mempertahankan hubungan diplomatik resmi. ^{[1] [2] [3]}

[ edit ] History [ sunting ] Sejarah

In the 1962 Asian Games held in Jakarta, President Sukarno refused the entry of delegations from Israel. Dalam Asian Games 1962 yang diselenggarakan di Jakarta, Presiden Sukarno menolak masuknya delegasi dari Israel.
In 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin met Indonesian President Suharto at his private residence in Jakarta. Pada tahun 1993, Perdana Menteri Israel Yitzhak Rabin bertemu dengan Presiden Indonesia Soeharto di kediaman pribadinya di Jakarta. This, what press said as Rabin's unscheduled visit, happen during Suharto's chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement and short after the Oslo Accords . Ini, apa pers dikatakan sebagai Teman terjadwal kunjungan Rabin, terjadi selama's kepemimpinan Soeharto dari Gerakan Non-Blok dan pendek setelah Kesepakatan Oslo . This was the first ever high profile meeting between both leaders. ^{[ 4 ]} Ini adalah tinggi pertama yang pernah profil rapat antara kedua pemimpin. ^[4]
In 1999, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid and Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab mentioned their wishes to open ties with Israel although only at the level of economic and trade links. ^{[ 5 ]} In a 2002 Wahid explained his respect for Israel and posed a challenging "correction" to be addressed by his fellow Muslims: Pada tahun 1999, Presiden Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid dan Menteri Luar Negeri Alwi Shihab tersebut keinginan mereka untuk membuka hubungan dengan Israel meskipun hanya pada tingkat hubungan ekonomi dan perdagangan. ^[5] Dalam 2002 Wahid menjelaskan ia menghormati Israel dan menimbulkan "menantang" koreksi harus ditangani oleh sesama Muslim:

Israel believes in God. Israel percaya pada Allah. While we have a diplomatic relationship and recognising diplomatically China and Russia, which are atheist states, then it's strange that we don't acknowledge Israel. Meskipun kami memiliki hubungan diplomatik dan pengakuan diplomatik Cina dan Rusia, yang adalah negara ateis, maka itu aneh bahwa kami tidak mengakui Israel. This is the thing that we have to correct within Islam. ^{[ 6 ]} Ini adalah hal yang harus kita benahi dalam Islam. ^[6]

In 2005, the Indonesian Government said that establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel will only be possible after peace has been reached between Israel and the Palestinians . ^{[ 7 ]} Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom held a discreet first meeting with his Indonesian counterpart Hassan Wirayuda during a UN summit in New York in September 2005. Pada tahun 2005, Pemerintah Indonesia mengatakan bahwa membangun hubungan diplomatik penuh dengan Israel hanya akan mungkin setelah perdamaian telah dicapai antara Israel dan Palestina . ^[7] Menteri Luar Negeri Israel Silvan Shalom mengadakan pertemuan pertama diam-diam dengan rekannya Bahasa Indonesia Hassan Wirayuda selama KTT PBB di New York pada bulan September 2005. However, President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ruled out establishing formal diplomatic ties but said: "Any communication between Indonesian and Israeli officials will be oriented to the objective of assisting the Palestinian people in gaining their independence". ^{[ 3 ]} Namun, Presiden Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono dikesampingkan membangun hubungan diplomatik formal, tetapi berkata: Setiap komunikasi antara Indonesia Israel pejabat akan dan berorientasi pada tujuan membantu Palestina pada orang memperoleh mereka "kemerdekaan." ^[3]
In July 2006, the Indonesian Government and several Indonesian Muslim groups condemned Israel's ongoing military operation in Gaza and demanded the release of arrested Palestinian officials. Pada bulan Juli 2006, Pemerintah Indonesia dan beberapa kelompok Muslim Indonesia mengutuk operasi militer itu berlangsung Israel di Gaza dan meminta pembebasan para pejabat Palestina ditangkap. The Government said ^{[ 2 ]} Pemerintah mengatakan ^[2]
In a visit to Singapore in 2006, the Israeli Arab diplomat Ali Yahya called for direct ties between Israel and Indonesia . Dalam sebuah kunjungan ke Singapura pada tahun 2006, Arab Israel diplomat Ali Yahya menyerukan hubungan langsung antara Israel dan Indonesia . In an interview to Jakarta post he said, Dalam sebuah wawancara untuk memposting Jakarta ia berkata,

I misunderstand why the relationship between the majorities of Muslims in Asia is hostile to Israel. Aku salah mengerti mengapa hubungan antara mayoritas Muslim di Asia bermusuhan dengan Israel. If it is because of Israel and Palestine, then (how can it be reconciled that) we have peace with Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, but not with eastern Asia? Jika itu karena Israel dan Palestina, maka (bagaimana bisa berdamai bahwa) kita memiliki kedamaian dengan Jordan, Mesir, Maroko, tetapi tidak dengan Asia Timur? We protect the holy places in Israel, respect the Arabic language, and bring imams and rabbis together to have discussions. Kami melindungi tempat-tempat suci di Israel, menghormati bahasa Arab, dan membawa imam dan rabi bersama-sama untuk berdiskusi. I am posing a question if the Muslim countries in Asia can open the gate to their country for us, so that we can open up relations with them. Saya mengajukan sebuah pertanyaan jika negara-negara Islam di Asia dapat membuka pintu gerbang ke negara mereka untuk kita, sehingga kita bisa membuka hubungan dengan mereka. There are so many opportunities in Israel and by stressing the need for cooperation we would like to get these countries to also have a share of these opportunities. Ada begitu banyak kesempatan di Israel dan dengan menekankan perlunya kerjasama kami ingin mendapatkan negara-negara ini juga memiliki bagian dari kesempatan ini. But to do that, we need to have the opportunity to talk directly to these countries, which I hope, will come up soon. ^{[ 8 ]} Tapi untuk melakukan itu, kita perlu memiliki kesempatan untuk berbicara langsung dengan negara-negara ini, yang saya harap, akan muncul segera. ^[8]

During the 2006 Lebanon War , Indonesia called on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Selama Perang Lebanon 2006 , Indonesia meminta Israel untuk menarik pasukannya dari Libanon. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry advised that the national tennis team was pulling out of its Federation Cup matches in Israel saying "We are witnessing a military invasion by Israel and the arrest of scores of Palestinian officials...It is now impossible to play there". ^{[ 9 ]} Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia menyarankan agar tim tenis nasional menarik manfaat dari Piala Federasi pertandingan di Israel mengatakan "Kita sedang menyaksikan invasi militer oleh Israel dan penangkapan sejumlah pejabat Palestina ... Sekarang mungkin untuk bermain di sana". ^[9]
In 2008 , the Jakarta Post printed a letter from Israeli Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Majalli Wahabi , urging Indonesia to take a role in advocating for peace in the Middle East . Pada tahun 2008 , dalam Jakarta Post mencetak surat dari Israel Wakil Menteri Luar Negeri, Majalli Wahabi , mendesak Indonesia untuk mengambil peran dalam advokasi untuk perdamaian di Timur Tengah . Analysts suggested that the printing of the letter might be a signal of a thaw between the two nations. ^{[ 10 ]} However, the Gaza War that lasted from late December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009 affected relations. Analis menyarankan bahwa pencetakan surat mungkin sinyal dari mencair antara kedua negara. ^[10] Namun, Perang Gaza yang berlangsung dari 27 akhir, Desember 2008 sampai 18 Januari 2009 hubungan terpengaruh. Indonesia harshly condemned Israeli action, labeling it as "aggression", and expressed its support of the Palestinians. Indonesia mengutuk keras tindakan Israel, pelabelan itu sebagai "agresi", dan menyatakan dukungannya terhadap Palestina.

[ edit ] Agreements [ sunting ] Perjanjian

In 2008, Indonesia signed a medical cooperation agreement with Israel's national emergency medical service with USD200,000. ^{[ 1 ]} Pada tahun 2008, Indonesia menandatangani perjanjian kerjasama medis dengan pelayanan medis darurat nasional Israel dengan USD200, 000. <sup>[1]



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